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Introduction
It is difficult to deny the growing interest in 
applying Darwinian principles and evolutionary 
thinking to problems of social science (Jeffrey 
1996; Essletzbichler, Rigby 2007). For example, 
recent work sets forth to generalise Darwinism 
to the areas of social and economic evolution 
(Hodgson, Knudsen 2010); to develop a gener-
al framework for economics and public policy 
grounded in evolutionary theory (Wilson, Gow-
dy 2013); and to identify the conditions under 
which cooperative social institutions evolve and 
adapt to their environments over time (Heinrich 
et al. 2004; Gintis et al. 2005; Wilson et al. 2013). 
These illustrations, as well as a plenitude of re-
lated literature (e.g., Bowles 2006; Dunbar 2007; 
van den Bergh, Gowdy 2009), reasonably foretell 
of a steady decline in the erstwhile reluctance of 
some social scientists to draw on evolutionary 
theory in their research (see: Pumain 1998; Lus-
tick 2011).
Yet in this era of emerging evolutionary ac-
cession in the social sciences, many appeals to 
evolutionary principles, for example in human 
geography within the subdiscipline of evolu-
tionary economic geography (EEG), are made 
exclusively for metaphorical purposes (Essletz-
bichler, Rigby 2007). As Boschma and Frenken 
(2006: 274) observe, much of this work essentially 
pays “lip service” to evolutionary thinking and 
concepts, while neglecting to advance a general 
framework firmly rooted in evolutionary theory. 
Absent such a framework, continuing to practice 
the piecemeal adoption of evolutionary vocabu-
lary in the social sciences plausibly results in in-
consistent usage of biological terms, and, by ex-
tension, the downgraded validity and reliability 
8 RUSSELL C. WEAvER
of those terms outside of their native disciplines 
(Essletzbichler, Rigby 2007). In what is perhaps 
a prefigurative look at the future of EEG, how-
ever, several scholars are beginning to synthesise 
the subdiscipline’s extant metaphorical applica-
tions in order to outline an agenda, and propose 
approaches, for establishing a general Darwini-
an evolutionary framework that can be applied 
more uniformly across the field (Boschma, Fren-
ken 2006; Essletzbichler, Rigby 2007). 
Parallel developments cannot be discussed for 
urban geography (Ghitter, Smart 2009). In fact, de-
spite a voluminous body of scholarship on urban 
change and dynamics (Megbolugbe et al. 1996; 
Wyly 1999; Pitkin 2001; Somerville et al. 2009), 
much of which ostensibly describes evolutionary 
processes (Allen 1997; Wyly 1999), an urban coun-
terpart to EEG has not emerged within the human 
geography literature. As an example, consider 
that at the time of this writing, executing a Google 
Scholar search on the exact phrase “evolutionary 
urban geography” yields a single result (Ghitter, 
Smart 2009), compared to 1,440 results for “evo-
lutionary economic geography”.1 And, as is the 
case with much work in EEG, that one result uses 
evolutionary terminology more for metaphor-
ical and analogical purposes than for construct-
ing a general framework (e.g., Boschma, Frenken 
2006; Essletzbichler, Rigby 2007). As is discussed 
in subsequent sections, the lack of movement in 
this direction is potentially due to a turn in the 
urban literature toward self-organisation (e.g., Al-
len 1997). Yet while some authors proffer self-or-
ganisation as a general theory of evolution unto 
itself, it is easily shown to depend on Darwinian 
processes (Hodgson, Knudsen 2010).
That a general Darwinian-evolutionary pro-
ject has not been undertaken in urban geography 
is therefore surprising on one hand, but some-
what unsurprising on the other. With respect 
to the former, many classic and contemporary 
urban geography models specify the elements 
and interactions that give rise to urban sprawl 
(Torrens 2006) and neighbourhood succession 
(e.g., Hoyt 1939; Grigsby et al. 1987), among oth-
er things. Clearly these phenomena represent 
changes to complex population systems, which 
1 The Google Scholar search mentioned here was last 
executed on 22 May 2013.
collectively intimate the operation of evolution-
ary forces (Hodgson, Knudsen 2010). Important-
ly, though, it is widely held that such changes are 
multi-causal and highly interdependent (Glaeser, 
Gyourko 2005). In this sense, it is not wholly sur-
prising that urban geography has avoided a di-
rect systematic appeal to generalised Darwinism 
to date; for evolutionary explanations of the Dar-
winian variety tend to be causal (Okasha 2006), 
and many phenomena of interest to urban geog-
raphers lack universally held causal explications 
(e.g., Wagenaar 2007).
Given this observation, is it therefore appro-
priate for urban geographers to resist an evo-
lutionary “turn” à la the movement under way 
in economic geography (e.g., Boschma, Frenken 
2006)? This essay argues that the answer to this 
question is an emphatic “no”. Indeed, I submit 
that evolutionary theory has much to offer urban 
geographers in terms of organising concepts and 
thinking critically about causality – although I by 
no means claim to resolve long-standing issues 
regarding the multi-causal nature of certain ur-
ban phenomena. Rather, this paper contextualis-
es key propositions from selected urban change 
and decline literature in Darwinian and evolu-
tionary terms, which leads me to advocate for the 
establishment of an “evolutionary urban geogra-
phy” grounded in Darwinian evolution in gener-
al, and multilevel selection theory in particular. 
To arrive at this outcome, the paper first intro-
duces and defines concepts that are crucial to 
conceiving of Darwinian evolution in hierarchi-
cal population structures. It then briefly surveys 
selected urban change literature from an evo-
lutionary perspective in search of new insights 
into the processes that generate manifestations 
of urban decline, especially blight and disorder. 
The exercise is intended to chart a course toward 
a general theoretical framework that can underlie 
an evolutionary urban geography.
Preliminaries: evolution and multilevel 
selection theory
By now it is common for individuals outside 
of the biological sciences to attribute the “dis-
covery” of evolution to Charles Darwin, even 
though rival theories pre- and post-date Dar-
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win’s seminal work (e.g., Mayr 2001; Hodgson, 
Knudsen 2010). That Darwin’s theory achieved 
such prominence and popularity relative to alter-
native explanations is due not simply to the over-
whelming evidence establishing it as fact (Mayr 
2001), but also to its exceedingly generalisable 
and flexible nature (Dawkins 2003; Wilson 2007, 
2011). 
To appreciate this point, consider the three ba-
sic ingredients of Darwinian evolution: variation, 
selection, and heritability (Mayr 2001; Wilson 
2007). First, suppose that there exists some pop-
ulation of discrete entities, all members of which 
possess some character, z. Further assume that z 
is distributed differentially across entities in the 
population, and that z is positively correlated to 
the “fitness” of entities. That is to say, z varies at 
the micro-level within the population, and this 
variation has population-level consequences (Wil-
son 2007; Lustick 2011). For example, if “fitness” 
is taken to mean offspring, then entities with high 
levels of z, because of the positive (hypothesised) 
correlation between z and offspring, will produce 
more progeny on average. Suppose now that off-
spring are sufficiently similar to parent entities, 
such that parents with high z transmit relatively 
high z to their offspring and likewise for parents 
with low z. Stated alternatively, z is heritable. It 
follows that over time the average level of z will 
increase in the population of entities, insofar as 
high-z entities produce more heirs than low-z en-
tities. Thus high z is selected for in the population. 
Apart from being necessarily oversimplified, 
the preceding narrative describes the general 
process by which evolutionary change occurs in 
a single-level population (Okasha 2006; Wilson 
2007; Lustick 2011). Crucially, observe that “this 
view of life” requires population thinking – pop-
ulations are comprised of heterogeneous mem-
bers, and individual-level dissimilarities (even-
tually) produce changes in the total population 
(Mayr 2001). In this regard, population thinking 
and Darwinian evolution suggest gradualism, 
or the idea that population changes are non-in-
stantaneous, as there exists some degree of fixity 
in member characteristics (Mayr 2001; Essletz-
bichler, Rigby 2007). For instance, it is only after 
a sufficient amount of reproduction that the pop-
ulation z level increases in the foregoing exam-
ple, via selection for high z.
Lewontin (1970) writes that this sort of evo-
lution by selection rests on three conditions: (1) 
variation in a particular trait; (2) associated dif-
ferences in fitness; and (3) heritability. While 
these “Lewontin conditions” (Okasha 2006) ef-
fectively echo Darwin’s principles of evolution, 
they also have considerable utility for generating 
unambiguous mathematical statements. Namely, 
if, as before, z is a trait owned by entities in a giv-
en population, then for evolution by selection to 
occur with respect to z it must be the case that:
1. var (z) ≠ 0;
2. bz ≠ 0;
3. h ≠ 0;
where var (z) is the statistical variance in trait z, 
bz is the coefficient derived by performing a re-
gression of entity fitness on z (i.e., fitness depends 
on z), and h is the coefficient derived by perform-
ing a regression of offspring z on parent z (i.e., z 
is heritable) (Okasha 2006). 
These so-called Lewontin conditions enu-
merate the basic information requirements for 
studying evolution by selection: a known popu-
lation that is comprised of discrete entities; a trait 
of interest that can be measured for all entities 
in the population and their heirs; and a way to 
conceptualise fitness for the population entities. 
Nonetheless, note that from an evolutionary out-
sider’s perspective the Lewontin conditions have 
few (obvious) implications for the possible role 
of socio-spatial context in evolutionary change. 
To wit, the conditions seem to imply only that 
entities interact in a single population, and that 
those entities with absolute fitness advantages 
modulo a particular beneficial trait will adapt to 
a given environment more successfully than their 
fellow entities, such that the population eventu-
ally comes to represent its best adapted members 
(e.g., Wilson 2004).
Picture now a population in which constit-
uents reside in spatially delimited groups, and 
that one’s success in the population depends not 
only on its own attributes, but also on how well 
those attributes interact with homologous traits 
in one’s fellow group members. For example, in 
the urban social world one’s quality of life hinges 
on both its own cooperation with local rules, and 
the extent to which one’s neighbours cooperate 
with those rules (e.g., Bourne 1981; Grigsby et al. 
1987; Wilson 2011). In the case of the urban com-
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mons, for instance, it has been shown that high 
neighbourhood cooperation with property main-
tenance rules influences local non-co-operators 
to cooperate, and mutatis mutandis for low neigh-
bourhood cooperation (Weaver, Bagchi-Sen [in 
press]). The number of (non)co-operators in the 
total population therefore evolves under group 
pressures. Hence, for such circumstances there is 
more to the evolution-by-selection story than the 
(single-level variety of the) Lewontin conditions 
presented above (Okasha 2006). Indeed, one can 
envisage the possibility of Darwinian selection 
operating at multiple levels (Wilson 2007).2 Stat-
ed alternatively, total evolutionary change in 
a given hierarchical population can be a function 
of individual and group attributes (Okasha 2006). 
This notion is a cornerstone of multilevel selection 
theory (MLS). 
Briefly, MLS assumes that populations are 
hierarchically organised, such that population 
entities are nested into groups wherein local in-
teractions take place (Okasha 2006; Wilson et 
al. 2013). More precisely, MLS literature reitera-
tively describes groups as “collectives” in which 
“particles” engage in fitness-affecting interac-
tions (Okasha 2006). By assuming a hierarchical-
ly organised population structure, MLS theory 
thus allows for the possibility of collective-level 
(“group”) selection (Okasha 2006; Wilson, Wil-
son 2007). Collective-level selection is important 
for overcoming the “fundamental problem of so-
cial life”, which is that traits contributing to par-
ticle fitness tend to undermine collective fitness 
(Wilson, Wilson 2007). A classic example of this 
problem is Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons, 
or the idea that when all individuals in a popu-
lation have open access to a single resource, the 
natural incentive to gain an advantage over con-
specifics leads all individuals to over-harvest the 
resource relative to its sustainable level, thereby 
diminishing its future availability and produc-
tivity. To resist the urge to over-harvest would 
place a given entity at a disadvantage relative to 
conspecifics, all of whom would gain from the lo-
2 Lewontin (1970) was well aware of multilevel selec-
tion. The use of the phrase “single-level variety of the 
Lewontin conditions” here is intended to describe 
only the context in which the conditions were pre-
sented above, and not to imply that Lewontin’s work 
(1970) did not consider the possibility of MLS.
calised cost borne by the cooperative entity (Wil-
son, Wilson 2007).
Generalising this logic, at the single-particle 
level, evolutionary theory appears to disfavour 
the emergence of pro-social or group-beneficial 
behaviour, given that such behaviours are in-
dividually costly and susceptible to free-riding 
(Wilson, Wilson 2007). At the collective level, 
by contrast, it is far less problematic to see how 
cooperation might evolve. Namely, if collectives 
are to “survive” in the total population, then in-
tra-collective particle competition like that in 
Hardin’s (1968) tragedy must be selected against 
(Wilson 2007, 2011). For collectives whose parti-
cles, say, destroy fitness-enhancing resources will 
be less “fit” in the overall population than fellow 
collectives whose particles cooperate to sustain 
their resources over time. It follows that selection 
at the group level can steadily reduce the pres-
ence of the former, self-regarding types within 
the environment. In other words, collective-level 
selection gradually favours cooperation amongst 
interacting particles (Wilson 2007, 2011; Wilson, 
Wilson 2007).
MLS theory therefore proposes that selec-
tion operates simultaneously at multiple levels 
of a hierarchically structured population (Oka-
sha 2006). Analogous to the single, particle-lev-
el scenario from earlier, then, this implies that 
at a given collective level of selection, collectives 
must (1) possess some fitness-affecting character, 
(2) which varies across collectives in the popula-
tion, and (3) which is heritable. Concerning the 
latter of these, collective heritability can occur in 
two varieties: either, (a) collectives give rise to 
new collectives, or (b) collectives give rise to new 
particles whose characteristics are similar to those 
found in the parent collectives (Okasha 2006). 
The implication is that in addition to the (now 
multilevel) information requirements of the Le-
wontin conditions, evolutionary studies of hier-
archical populations must specify a “focal” unit 
of selection – collectives or particles. 
Together these elements form the beginnings 
of a framework for studying change in complex 
urban population systems. Prior to moving for-
ward, however, it is constructive to articulate 
“one of the most important distinctions in evo-
lutionary theory”: the distinction between ulti-
mate and proximate causation (Lloyd et al. 2011: 
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13). Ultimate causation relates to the function 
of a given attribute, or why it exists. Proximate 
causation relates to the attribute’s mechanism, or 
how it comes to manifest (Lloyd et al. 2011). As 
mentioned above, urban decline is largely seen 
as a multi-causal process, the source(s) of which 
can often go undetected (e.g., Wagenaar 2007). In 
other words, it has proven difficult to consistently 
explicate the cause(s) of decline or its various in-
dicators, such as “urban blight” (Shlay, Whitman 
2006; Weaver 2013). When viewed through the 
ultimate-proximate lens, though, one can begin 
to categorise the many possible causes of blight. 
For example, it is fairly straightforward to im-
agine that a proximate cause of the problem – i.e., 
a mechanism that facilitates it – is insufficient 
property maintenance or failure to cooperate 
with local rules and norms that relate to property 
upkeep (Skogan 1986; Brueckner, Helsley 2011; 
Weaver 2013). At the same time, the ultimate 
cause of the problem, or the reason why it has 
become adapted to urban society, might involve 
its association with structural issues such as pov-
erty and the uneven socio-spatial distribution of 
capital (e.g., Pacione 2003).
Collectively the aforementioned concepts, 
which originate in the Darwinian and MLS sec-
tors of evolutionary theory, and together with 
the ultimate-proximate causation distinction, can 
provide a working evolutionary framework for 
urban geography. The remainder of the paper 
supports this statement by synthesising illustra-
tive arguments from the literature on urban de-
cline, particularly those concerning the related 
issues of blight and disorder, within an evolu-
tionary urban geography context.
Urban change and neighbourhood 
decline
A comprehensive review of the literature on 
urban change and decline is beyond the scope 
of this essay, and interested readers should re-
fer to, inter alia, Grigsby et al. (1987), Megbolug-
be et al. (1996), Pitkin (2001), Pacione (2003), or 
Somerville et al. (2009) for more depth on the 
topics that follow. Here the focus is narrowly on 
a handful of matters that concern manifestations 
of urban decline, particularly “blight” (Weaver, 
Bagchi-Sen 2013; Weaver 2013) and “disorder” 
(Ross, Mirowsky 1999; vitale 2008). 
Theories of (multiple) deprivation hold that 
complex urban problems such as property aban-
donment and poor housing conditions, and even 
crime, are caused by poverty (Pacione 2003). 
More specifically, economic deprivation usurps 
much of an individual’s power to alter his or her 
own quality of life, and this leads to individu-
al-level decision-making that is incongruent with 
some aggregate-level (e.g., city or neighbour-
hood) paradigm of social control (Pacione 2003; 
vitale 2008). These individual-aggregate tensions 
are observed in things such as poorly maintained 
homes, overgrown lawns, and the presence of 
graffiti, trash, and debris in visible public and 
private spaces (Ross, Mirowsky 1999). For sim-
plicity and facility of exposition, it is henceforth 
assumed that these and related conditions can be 
collapsed into the associated concepts of “disor-
der” and “blight”, and that they can be approx-
imated by substandard real property conditions 
(e.g., Weaver 2013). 
The view that poverty – particularly spatially 
concentrated poverty – in cities is responsible for 
the existence of substandard property conditions 
is rather widely held in the social sciences (Pa-
cione 2003; Grigsby et al. 1987; Megbolugbe et al. 
1996; Glaeser, Gyourko 2005). The argument is 
that individual-level lack of economic resources 
makes property maintenance a low priority and 
thus an insufficiently taken action among low-in-
come households, and this gives rise to blight or 
disorder in urban neighbourhoods (Megbolugbe 
et al. 1996). Over time, these visible (as well as 
the latent) conditions of neighbourhood poverty 
motivate those households with adequate means 
to relocate (Wagenaar 2007). During this process 
the residual composition of such neighbourhoods 
becomes increasingly impoverished. Only house-
holds that lack the resources necessary to relocate 
remain (Glaeser, Gyourko 2005); and any incom-
ing households likely enter only because their 
location decisions are severely constrained by 
low incomes, and housing tends to be relatively 
inexpensive in blighted areas (Krumm, vaughan 
1976; Weaver, Bagchi-Sen [in press]). As a result, 
poverty progressively concentrates in blighted 
urban spaces, and property conditions therein 
continue to deteriorate (Glaeser, Gyourko 2005).
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Within this context, one can argue that pover-
ty is perhaps the underlying reason for blight and 
disorder (Grigsby et al. 1987). Nevertheless, the 
more immediate reason for such problems is the 
deficient levels of property investment or main-
tenance just described (e.g., Brueckner, Helsley 
2011; Weaver 2013). Importantly, urban scholars 
invariably recognise that deficient property main-
tenance is highly vulnerable to spatial externali-
ties (Bourne 1981; Grigsby et al. 1987; Megbolug-
be et al. 1996). In other words, because property 
values are known to be spatially interdependent, 
blighted properties tend to devalue all properties 
with which they share a neighbourhood (Bourne 
1981). Devaluation, in turn, reduces the returns to 
local property maintenance, and this potentially 
influences neighbouring households – including 
those that previously maintained their properties 
at or exceeding some optimal level – to abstain 
from the activity (Megbolugbe et al. 1996). This 
implies that household poverty is not a necessary 
condition for the creation of all individual-lev-
el blight or disorder. Rather, households may 
choose to cooperate (maintain property) or not 
cooperate (not maintain property) based on their 
spatial locations within relatively cooperative or 
non-cooperative neighbourhoods (Bourne 1981).
Along these lines we have at least two causal 
explanations for the creation of blight or disor-
der within an urban area. Adherents to the first, 
poverty-based explanation tend to include crit-
ical urban geographers who follow the political 
economy approach (Harvey 1976; Pacione 2003). 
Namely, understanding urban decline in capital-
ist societies begins by recognising that capitalist 
competition for urban space inevitably results in 
geographically uneven development, as capital 
is distributed to locations where the gains to be 
made are greatest (Pacione 2003). The explicit 
causal process at work in this explanation is suc-
cinctly described by Pacione (2003: 316) as fol-
lows:
“The differential use of space by capital in 
search of profit creates a mosaic of inequality at 
all geographic levels from global to local. Con-
sequently, at any one time certain countries, re-
gions, cities and localities will be in the throes of 
decline as a result of the retreat of capital investment, 
while others will be experiencing the impact of 
capital inflows. At the metropolitan scale the 
outcome of this uneven development process is 
manifested in sociospatial variations in life quality 
and, in particular, in the poverty, powerlessness, 
and polarization of disadvantaged residents (em-
phasis added).”
It is clear from this passage that the politi-
cal economy perspective regards inequality as 
a precursor to neighbourhood disorder. Uneven 
development produces a class of disadvantaged 
residents, and, in sequence, conditions of local-
ised poverty cause urban problems such as blight 
and disorder to appear in spaces of retreating 
capital (Pacione 2003). Although the term ‘evolu-
tion’ does not feature in this narrative, the view 
bears certain hallmarks of an evolutionary expla-
nation – minimally, it describes a causal process 
by which change occurs in a complex population 
system. However, if the change of interest to re-
searchers and policymakers is in the level of the 
non-cooperative property maintenance “trait” in 
the urban population, then it can be shown that 
the resemblant evolutionary reasoning reaches 
an impasse when filtered through the concepts 
from above.
Recall that a given trait is subject to (Darwin-
ian) evolutionary forces when (1) it varies across 
entities in the relevant population, (2) variations 
in the trait have differential impacts on fitness, 
and (3) the trait is heritable (Lewontin 1970). In 
the political economy vision, non-cooperative 
property maintenance behaviour need not be her-
itable. Rather, it depends on the spaces of capital, 
such that current patterns of blight or disorder 
are explained by current patterns of investment, 
and not by prior property maintenance behaviour 
per se (e.g., Pacione 2003). Restating this in terms 
of the Lewontin (1970) conditions from above, 
performing a regression of household non-co-
operative behaviour for some time period, t, on 
household non-cooperative behaviour for some 
prior period, t – m, can indeed output a nonzero 
coefficient h; but this relationship would likely 
be spurious. For period t non-cooperative behav-
iour is determined by capital availability in t, and 
does not causally depend on non-cooperative be-
haviour during period t – m. The same argument 
applies at the neighbourhood level. Hence the 
political economy approach implies that change 
in non-cooperative maintenance behaviour is not 
itself evolutionary, but is a by-product of glob-
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ally-influenced changes in the flows of capital at 
different geographic scales. Using the language 
from above, whereas a comprehensive functional 
and mechanistic understanding of a given attrib-
ute enables policymakers to become “wise man-
agers” of the processes that generate it (Wilson 
2007: 11), in the political economy view there is 
no specification of a mechanism that can be target-
ed for intervention. Rather, the implication is that 
structural policy reforms are needed to counter-
act uneven development and eradicate economic 
inequality. This will presumably cancel out the 
function of non-cooperative maintenance behav-
iour in the environment. 
The second causal explanation for patterns of 
blight/disorder introduced above emphasises 
that the spatial interdependence of neighbour-
hood property values significantly influences 
household maintenance decisions. Specifically, 
because substandard property conditions con-
tribute to the devaluation of all properties in 
a given neighbourhood, they therefore reduce 
the returns to maintenance for all local house-
holds (Bourne 1981). In this sense, patterns of 
blight and disorder are the result of households 
interacting in localised prisoner’s dilemmas, 
wherein one’s decision to cooperate or defect is 
contingent on the expected or observed actions 
of one’s neighbours (Megbolugbe et al. 1996). 
From this perspective, the problem is an emer-
gent phenomenon that arises when households 
interact in space. Accordingly, the urban change 
and decline literature has shown an expanding 
interest in self-organisation (Allen 1997; Pumain 
1998; Batty, Xie 1999).
Self-organisation refers to the ability of in-
teracting components to (often inadvertently) 
determine the structure of their parent system 
(Hodgson, Knudsen 2010). Stated differently, in 
a self-organised system, pattern or order emerges 
from the many interactions of the system’s con-
stituent elements, where the resultant patterns 
tend to be unreflective of component-level in-
tentions (Pumain 1998; Hodgson, Knudsen 2010; 
Lustick 2011). For example, household-level de-
cisions to relocate from a city centre are almost 
certainly not directed toward setting off a chain 
reaction whereby poverty concentrates in urban 
centres, and inner-city neighbourhoods deterio-
rate both physically and economically; but it is 
from such particle-level interactions that sys-
tem-wide patterns of decline frequently emerge 
(Grigsby et al. 1987; Glaeser, Gyourko 2005).
Without a doubt the self-organisation para-
digm holds significant explanatory power over 
many complex emergent phenomena (Hodg-
son, Knudsen 2010), including patterns of urban 
change (Pumain 1998; Batty, Xie 1999). Yet while 
some scholars proffer self-organisation as a gen-
eral theory of evolution unto itself (Witt 1997), 
it is necessary to recognise that explaining the 
emergence of pattern and order does not neces-
sarily explain the survival and adaptability of 
that emergent order over time (Hodgson, Knud-
sen 2010). On the contrary, the (in)ability of an 
emergent pattern to adapt to its host environment 
is subject to, and dependent upon, the Darwinian 
process of selection (Hodgson, Knudsen 2010). 
Even key scholars of the self-organisation para-
digm, particularly in urban studies, acknowledge 
that self-organised patterns depend on Darwini-
an evolution (Allen 1997). 
Thus, as with the political economy approach, 
the self-organisation view is not a fully evolu-
tionary explanation of change in intra-urban 
non-cooperative property maintenance behav-
iour. Unlike the earlier explanation, though, 
the Lewontin (1970) conditions are satisfied – 
non-cooperative maintenance behaviour (1) var-
ies across space, (2) differentially affects house-
hold and neighbourhood utility, and (3) tends to 
be path-dependent (heritable) at both the particle 
and collective scales (e.g., Grigsby et al. 1987). 
Here what is missing is an ultimate cause, or an 
account of why emergent patterns adapt to their 
environments (e.g., Hodgson, Knudsen 2010). I 
therefore turn to evolutionary urban geography 
to see if the approach can produce new insights 
and policy implications.
Evolutionary urban geography and 
neighbourhood decline
Admittedly I have heretofore surveyed only 
a small and selected fraction of the literature on 
urban and neighbourhood decline (for more thor-
ough reviews, see: Megbolugbe et al. 1996; Pitkin 
2001; Somerville et al. 2009). Nonetheless, doing 
so allowed for identification of two alternative 
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explanations for the creation of urban blight/dis-
order, neither of which imparts a comprehensive 
causal understanding (proximate and ultimate) 
of the issue. In response to this, Table 1 synthe-
sises key pieces from each aforementioned expla-
nation within an evolutionary urban geography 
framework based on the core principles and con-
cepts unpacked throughout this essay. 
To begin, note that the interest is in explaining 
the evolution of non-cooperative (i.e., blight-gen-
erating) property maintenance behaviour in 
a given urban area at the household (particle) 
level. This is the same goal that was pursued in 
the foregoing explorations of the political econo-
my and self-organisation explanations of the phe-
nomenon. For the political economy approach, 
non-cooperative actions are a consequence of the 
spatial economic inequality created by the flow 
of capital (Pacione 2003), implying that managing 
blight entails long-term macro and structural re-
forms. For the self-organisation approach, blight 
or disorder is emergent. Patterns of blight are 
borne out of competitive individual interactions 
in urban space, where the payoffs to cooperative 
and non-cooperative behaviour are non-equiva-
lent. In this sense governing the problem means 
altering payoff structures to change behaviour, 
perhaps through enforcing penalties on non-co-
operation (e.g., vitale 2008).
Table 1 suggests that the problem of blight/
disorder is neither entirely structural (political 
economy) nor fully behavioural (self-organisa-
tion). Instead, by synthesising these two world-
views within an evolutionary perspective, one 
can argue that poverty creates a function for 
blight or disorder in an urban environment. This 
means that the property maintenance behaviour 
responsible for such outcomes is an adaptive strat-
Table 1. An evolutionary urban geography explanation of urban blight/disorder
Evolutionary concept Description
Synopsis
Patterns of blight/disorder reflect the simultaneous operation of individual 
and group selection. Household non-cooperative behaviour (deficient property 
maintenance) increases individual quality of life by decreasing upkeep costs, 
while it decreases neighbourhood order or social control. Low neighbour-
hood order commands low prices in the housing market, and so economically 
deprived households tend to sort into disorderly spaces. This sorting process 
facilitates geographic variation in order/disorder throughout an urban area. 
Focal unit of selection Particle (household)
Individual trait Non-cooperative behaviour (deficient maintenance)
Measure of individual fitness Quality of life (QoL)
Individual trait’s impact on 
fitness
The relationship between household QoL and non-cooperative behaviour is 
non-zero and positive; households that underinvest in property maintenance do 
so because the decision yields immediate benefits (e.g., cost deferment)
Heritability of individual trait Trait is heritable: household cooperative behaviour exhibits path-dependency 
Group trait Non-cooperative behaviour
Measure of group fitness Order/social control
Group trait’s impact on individ-
ual fitness
The impact of neighbourhood non-cooperative behaviour on household QoL is 
non-zero; for relatively wealthy households the relationship is negative, which 
gives rise to out-migration (capital mobility)
Group trait’s impact on group 
fitness
Negative: greater collective non-cooperation leads to more disorder/less social 
control
Heritability of group trait Collective (neighbourhood) trait is heritable; spatial externalities give rise to new particles (non-cooperators) in the population
Ultimate cause
The housing market places a significant discount on homes in blighted/disor-
derly neighbourhoods, which makes housing therein affordable for economical-
ly deprived households
Proximate cause(s)
Deficient property maintenance; positive assortment into orderly/disorderly 
neighbourhoods via housing transactions means that economically deprived 
households voluntarily trade off more order for cheaper housing; such “individ-
ual passivity” promotes more non-cooperative property maintenance behaviour, 
which begins to lock disorder into affected neighbourhoods
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egy for a subset of entities in the population (e.g., 
Grigsby et al. 1987). More precisely, the ability of 
poorly maintained urban spaces to host low-cost 
housing that supports economically disadvan-
taged households can be reasoned to ultimately 
cause blight or disorder (Weaver, Bagchi-Sen 
[in press]). At the same time, the key proximate 
cause from this explanation is deficient property 
maintenance (Brueckner, Helsley 2011). Deficient 
maintenance, in turn, generates negative spatial 
externalities, and patterns of household-level re-
sponses to those externalities produce changes in 
the presence of non-cooperative property main-
tenance behaviour at the population level (Weav-
er, Bagchi-Sen [in press]). 
To explore this evolutionary outcome in great-
er detail, observe first that households in urban 
areas reside in hierarchically organised popula-
tions, such that household “fitness” is a function 
of both household- and neighbourhood-level 
attributes (Pacione 2003). One can reasonably 
assume that household fitness depends on both 
the household’s own non-cooperative behaviour, 
as well as the non-cooperative behaviour of its 
neighbours (e.g., Bourne 1981). For non-coop-
erative households, underinvesting in proper-
ty maintenance presumably yields immediate 
utility gains, such as lowering housing expendi-
tures and thus freeing up income for other pur-
poses (Megbolugbe et al. 1996). Simultaneously, 
non-cooperative households can free-ride on, or 
enjoy the benefits of, the pro-social maintenance 
behaviours of its cooperative neighbours.
At the neighbourhood level, fitness (e.g., 
quality) varies and is differentially impactful 
on household utility across space (e.g., Skogan 
1986). As the political economy explanation sug-
gests, manifestations of decline (blight/disorder) 
negatively affect the utility of some households 
in a given neighbourhood, which in turn incen-
tivises them to relocate (Grigsby et al. 1987). 
This “retreat of capital” leads to concentrations 
of blight and decline in affected neighbourhoods 
(Pacione 2003; Weaver, Bagchi-Sen [in press]). 
Therein, property values, and by extension hous-
ing costs, spiral downward (Glaeser, Gyourko 
2005). The residual and entrant economically 
deprived households in such neighbourhoods 
then receive relatively low-cost housing in ex-
change for occupying blighted territories (Grigs-
by et al. 1987). If one assumes that low housing 
expenditures contribute positively to individual 
fitness for deprived households, then it is clear 
why low-quality neighbourhoods are frequently 
described as having “individual passivity, weak 
informal social control, and collective incapacity” 
with respect to neighbourhood decline (Skogan 
1986). In evolutionary parlance, non-cooperation 
leading to blight/disorder is an adaptation to an 
urban environment characterised by economic 
inequality. As stated above, then, the functional 
basis, or ultimate cause, of urban blight/disorder 
is that it makes housing affordable for economi-
cally deprived households (Weaver, Bagchi-Sen 
[in press]). As a result, housing transactions facil-
itate positive assortment into relatively high- and 
low-quality neighbourhoods based on willing-
ness (ability) to pay for certain neighbourhood 
conditions. These sorting patterns gradually lock 
in patterns of non-cooperative property main-
tenance behaviour across an urban area (e.g., 
Skogan 1986). It follows that the attribute value 
of a given property (cooperative or non-cooper-
ative) is path-dependent, and will tend to resem-
ble the state of the property at some prior point in 
time (e.g., Weaver, Bagchi-Sen [in press]).
Joining this observation to the self-organ-
isation explanation of blight or disorder, un-
controlled increases in within-neighbourhood 
non-cooperative behaviour stemming from this 
“individual passivity” can eventually spill over 
to relatively cooperative neighbourhoods (Sko-
gan 1986; Weaver, Bagchi-Sen 2013). That is, 
sufficiently powerful between-neighbourhood ef-
fects can change the composition of relatively 
high-quality neighbourhoods through the defec-
tion or departure of nearby co-operators in the 
urban environment (Bourne 1981). Crucially, this 
implies that non-cooperation at the collective lev-
el (the “group trait”) is also heritable, in the sense 
that household decisions are dependent upon 
encroaching neighbourhood characteristics – col-
lectives give rise to new particles (Megbolugbe 
et al. 1996; Weaver, Bagchi-Sen [in press]). With 
that it can be claimed that the Lewontin (1970) 
conditions are satisfied for two levels of a hier-
archically structured urban population (Table 
1). Accordingly, multilevel evolutionary forces 
presumptively operate on housing maintenance 
behaviour in urban societies. 
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To the extent that the evolutionary urban ge-
ography framework accounts for both function-
al and mechanistic sources of blight/disorder, it 
opens up the possibility for policymakers to be-
come “wise managers” of the evolutionary pro-
cesses that it describes (e.g., Wilson 2007: 11). At 
present, urban policymakers in westernised cities 
largely respond to the problems of blight and dis-
order by increasing the cost of non-cooperative 
maintenance behaviour, particularly by punish-
ing non-cooperators through monetary or other 
penalties (vitale 2008). Such punitive approaches 
tend to be socially exclusive and “privilege ma-
joritarian views of appropriate public behaviour” 
(vitale 2008: 13). In addition, they outwardly 
hint at an unawareness of the problem’s ulti-
mate cause, as established above. For, so long as 
blight/disorder serves the functional purpose of 
creating spaces of low-cost housing that support 
low-income households in urban systems, im-
parting economic or physical sanctions on (often 
resource-limited) non-cooperators will likely ex-
acerbate underlying issues of economic inequal-
ity in a particular urban area (e.g., vitale 2008). 
Taking this into consideration, evolutionary 
urban geography recommends that for a poli-
cy intervention to succeed, it must make coop-
eration a selectively advantageous action. For 
reasons articulated in the preceding paragraph, 
exclusively punitive measures do not stand up 
to this task. Accordingly, while macro and struc-
tural reforms are important for addressing long-
term economic inequality (e.g., Pacione 2003), 
immediate attention might be usefully directed 
to the environment in which blight and disorder 
evolves. For example, some U.S. and Western Eu-
ropean cities have successfully implemented pro-
grams to shift urban power relations in ways that 
grant decision-making authority to citizen lead-
ers in blighted communities (Shlay, Whitman 
2006; Wagenaar 2007). Others have designed 
multi-pronged programs to provide households 
with options from which they can self-select into 
a cooperative strategy, and to leverage public and 
private resources to rehabilitate properties occu-
pied by low-income and disadvantaged house-
holds (Weaver 2013). Based on the initial suc-
cesses of these approaches (e.g., Shlay, Whitman 
2006; Wagenaar 2007; Weaver 2013), it is highly 
probable that jointly attending to structural (ulti-
mate: e.g., power relations) and behavioural mat-
ters (proximate: e.g., self-selection into coopera-
tive strategies) is the path to improving upon the 
evolutionary outcomes described in this section. 
Having said that, by reframing and synthesising 
existing causal explanations of blight and disor-
der, evolutionary urban geography offers valu-
able insights for becoming “wise(r) managers of 
evolutionary processes” (Wilson 2007: 11). I sub-
mit that this result is not unique to issues relating 
to urban decline, but that it can be realised for re-
search questions in urban geography writ large.
Conclusions
Despite growing interest in the application of 
Darwinian evolutionary concepts and ideas to 
contemporary research questions in human ge-
ography, the literature is largely characterised 
by isolated metaphors and analogies that tend 
to be disconnected from a broader evolutionary 
theoretical framework (Jeffrey 1996; Boschma, 
Frenken 2006). While this under-appreciation of 
evolutionary theory is observable in economic 
geography (Essletzbichler, Rigby 2007: 566), in 
urban geography even these isolated metaphori-
cal appeals, notwithstanding a general evolution-
ary framework, are mostly unassembled. In this 
paper I attempt to demarcate, and illustrate the 
potential of, an “evolutionary urban geography” 
by outlining the elements and relationships that 
are thought to be essential ingredients of a gener-
al evolutionary framework for inquiries into ur-
ban spatial phenomena. Observations about the 
spatially interdependent nature of urban house-
holds and neighbourhoods suggest that such 
a framework be grounded in Darwinian and mul-
tilevel selection theories. This essay accordingly 
synthesises key components from these theories 
in an application to the issues of urban blight 
and disorder, to showcase how an evolutionary 
perspective produces new insights for managing 
complex urban problems. Nevertheless, this is 
merely one modest step toward a general Evo-
lutionary Urban Geography, and future research 
is needed both to further develop its theoretical 
foundations, and to empirically “demonstrate 
the utility of the evolutionary toolkit” (Wilson, 
Gowdy 2013: 7).
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